For Moscow, the system undermines global security and violates the current balance of nuclear force. With Romania having agreed to host US interceptor missiles in 2015, Russia is likely to reassess its position on strategic issues in its dialogue with Washington. It will bear most on negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) — not to forget Iran, where Washington has been avidly trying to obtain Moscow’s support for sanctions.

The reaction of Russian officials to the latest development may have been guarded but that does not in any way suggest a stepping-back on an issue strongly felt in the Kremlin. Washington is probably cognisant that Russian concerns do not stem from the Sm-3 interceptors targeting short and medium range missiles, to be deployed in the first phase in Romania. It is the second generation of interceptors planned for 2018 that is worrisome for its bearing on Russian nuclear deterrence.

Russian displeasure with the US arises from it reneging on a commitment to consult Moscow on any developments in the missile defense system — a highly contentious issue. That is why Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced his disappointment over the US not meeting its commitment. Clearly, Russia expects US to consult it before going ahead with deploying the system in Eastern Europe. These expectations are based on Washington’s previous assurances and its readiness to reset relations with its former Cold-War opponent. At the same time, Russia is aware of the fact that the US is not under obligation to share data on the missile defense system—the main reason for its disconcertment. Even as US President Barack Obama has gone the extra length in assuring Russia of the sincerity of his pledges to improve relations, the wariness between the two remains a tangible reality. Previous assurances on consulting Moscow now sound hollow and insincere. It has also given the Russians an opportunity to back out of a possible reduction in its strategic arsenal — a major policy agenda of president Obama and one that contradicts the new Russian military doctrine.

Clearly, the demands of realpolitik require deft negotiations and compromises on both sides. Russia is likely to now deliberate on its position on sanctions on Iran, something it was seen to be conceding to only recently.

As for Washington, it needs to prioritise its agenda and its long-term objectives. It seems to be falling ten steps back for every one step forward. More importantly, it must realise the implications of its policies, especially its strategic deterrence systems for partners like Russia. Is deploying an anti-missile system against a far-fetched future Iranian missile threat a feasible option, at the risk of alienating a strategic partner like Russia?